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ABSTRACT 
We discuss the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. We introduce a concept of 
monotonicity which is related to the diminution of the range between belief and plausibility. We 
show that the accumulation of knowledge in this framework exhibits a nonmonotonic property. 
We show how the belief structure can be used to represent typical or commonsense knowledge. 
1. Introduction 
What appears to be a central characteristic of commonsense knowledge is the possibility of 
nonmonotonicity. By this we mean that the addition of knowledge may cause us to withdraw some 
previously made inference. 
In this paper, we look at the theory of evidence (Demp 1967 & Shafer 1976) and particularly 
the process of normalization. We show that this process introduces an inherent nonmonotonicity 
into the Dempster-Shafer framework. This inherent nonmonotonicity, we feel, makes this 
representation scheme a suitable one for the representation of default knowledge. We then show 
how the belief structure provides a formalism for representing commonsense knowledge. 
2. Information and Monotonicity in the Theory of Evidence 
In this section, we introduce a number of issues related to the information contained in a 
belief structure and provide a concept of monotonicity for the belief structures. 
Assume m is a belief structure on the set X. Basically the information contained in a belief 
structure consists of knowledge about the probabilities of events in X. This view is very much in 
the spirit of Dempster's original work. We note that the essential feature of the belief structure is 
that the information it contains about the probabilities is generally imprecise (lacks specificity). 
Given the belief structure m for any subset A of X, the probability of A is known to satisfy the 
following inequality. 
Bel(A) � Prob(A) � Pl(A). 
For a given event A, we can use the term 
r A = Pl(A) - Bel(A) 
to measure the uncertainty associated with our knowledge of the probability of A. If r A = 0 then we 
exactly know the probability of A. Shafer calls a belief structure in which r A = 0, for all A, a 
Bayesian belief structure. This type of structure requires that the focal elements be all singletons. It 
is essentially the classical probability structure. 
In order to motivate and justify the work that follows, we make the following simple 
observation. Assume 
then it naturally follows that 
a1 � Prob(A) � b1 
a2 � Prob(A) � b2 
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for any a2 � a1 and b2 � b1. 
Put another, way given that Prob(A) E [a l , btl we can infer that Prob(A) E [a2, b2J· We 
note that the second interval is wider, less specific, but still valid. In the above we note that [a 1 ,b 1 J 
c [a2,b2]. 
This observation provides the basis for the introduction of an inference among belief 
structures which was introduced by Yager ( 1986). 
Assume m 1 and m2 are two belief structures on X such that for every subset A of X the 
following condition is satisfied 
[Bel1 (A), Pl1 (A)] c [Bel2(A), PI2(A)] 
If the above condition holds then it follows that knowledge that m 1 is true allows us to infer that m2 
is true. A more general formulation of this result is possible. 
Def.: Assume m1 is a belief structure in which A1, ... Ap are the focal elements with weights 
m(Aj) = a 1. Let m2 be another belief structure in which the focal elements can be represented as 
Btl • B12, ... Btnr B21, B22• ··· B2n2• ... Bpi• Bp2• ... Bpnp 
where 
m2(Bjj) = bij· 
In addition assume that for each i = 1, ..... p the following two conditions are satisfied 
1. Ai c Bij for allj = 1, . .. ni 
n 
2. L rn(Bij) = ai 
j=l 
In this situation we say that m1 entails m2 and denote this as 
Yager (1986) proves the following result. 
Theorem: If 
then for every subset A 
rn1 c m2. 
[Bel1 (A), Pl1 (A)] c [Bel2(A), Pl2(A)} 
As a result of this theorem we can see that if m 1 c m2 then the knowledge that m 1 is a valid 
description of the world allows us to infer that m2 is also true. We can see that if m 1 c m2 then m 1 
t- m2. We can say that if m1 c m2 m1 is a more specific representation. 
We should note that the process of gaining knowledge in the D-S framework can be seen as 
obtaining more specific belief functions as the representation of our knowledge. 
In logic the concept of monotonicity plays a fundamental role. It essentia lly is a 
manifestation of the fact that the gaining of knowledge allows us to know more about the world. 
Assume P1, P2, ... P n are a collection of propositions from which we can deduce the 
proposition H, we denote this as 
(P l. P2, ... Pn) I- H 
The situation is considered to be monotonic if the addition of any proposition, Pn+ 1, still 
allows us to infer H, that is 
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(Pl, Pz, Pn, Pn+l) t- H 
The environment is called non-monotonic if the addition of some proposition may require us to 
withdraw the validity of H. 
We are now in a position to introduce an analogous concept of monotonicity in the 
Dempster-Shafer framework. In the Dempster-Shafer framework the role of propositions a_re 
played by belief structures. Assume m 1, mz, ... mq are a collection of belief structures. The 
process of reasoning in this framework consists of the aggregation (conjunction) of pieces of 
evidence. In particular if 
then 
(ml, m2, ... mq) t- m 
where m is any belief structure such that 
* m em. 
Thus in the D-S framework we can infer any belief structure which contains (is entailed by) 
the intersection of the constituent belief structures. We shall say that the situation is monotonic if 
for any additional ffiq+ 1, the conjunction 
satisfies 
m1 (I m2 .. . mq (I tllq+l = m+ 
+ * * * m em (m rlmq+l em) 
This concept of monotonicity is based upon the fact that, if m + e m * then from m + we can use the 
entailment principle to infer any belief structure inferred by m *. 
We should note that the view taken in this Dempster-Shafer approach is essentially a 
generalization of the model theoretic approach in logic. In that view we associate with any 
proposition Pi a set Si of possible worlds that are true under Pi. Then 
* S =Strl ... Sq 
are the worlds acceptable to all the propositions. A proposition H is inferable if the set of possible 
worlds, SH, that make H true satisfies 
* S cSH. 
3. Normalization and NonMMonotonicity 
In this section we shall investigate the reasoning process in the Dempster-Shafer theory, the 
conjunction of pieces of evidence, in regards to its satisfying the previously described monotonicity 
condition. We shall show that in general monotonicity is not always guaranteed in the Dempster­
Shafer framework. More specifically, when the aggregation of evidence has conflicts, focal 
elements that have null intersection, then a nonmonotonicity is introduced. On the other hand if 
there is no conflicts amongst the evidence, then monotonicity is guaranteed. Thus it is generally !lQl 
the case that 
mtr1m2cm1, 
only when there is no conflicts does the result hold. 
The following example will help illustrate the issues. Assume that m 1 and m2 are two belief 
structures such that 
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m1 (X)= 1 - a  m2(X) = 1 - � 
Using Dempster's rule if A n B -:1: «1> the aggregation of these two pieces of evidence results in the 
belief structme m where 
We note in this case that 
as well as 
The fact that 
Focal element 
AnB 
A 
B 
X 
m1 nm2 cm1 
Weight 
a� 
aj3 
a� 
a� 
follows from the fact that A n B and A are both contained in A and have a sum of weights equal a. 
In addition both B and X are contained in X and sum to a. 
More generally we can prove the following theorem Yager (1986): 
Theorem: Assume m 1 and mz are two belief structures with focal elements A 1, .. . Ap and B 1, ... 
Bq. If for all Ai and B} Ai n Bj -:�: «1> then 
m1 nm2 cm1 
and ml nmz cmz. 
Thus we see that if no conflicts arise the reasoning process is monotonic. An implication of 
this observation is that, as we obtain more information, in terms of additional belief structures, 
which doesn't conflict with what we already have then our overall knowledge increases. This 
follows since our ranges, the r A's get smaller. In the case in which conflicts arise between focal 
elements the situation becomes different. If we consider the previous example but with the case in 
which A n B = <I> then we get 
Focal element 
A 
B 
X 
Weight 
aj3/1-a� 
a�/1-a� 
a�/1-a� 
In this case it is not necessarily the case that m1 n mz c m1. This case can be seen as 
follows. We frrst note that 
thus 
In m = m1 n mz, since An B = «1> then 
Pl1 (A)= 1 
Bel1 (A)= a 
Prob1 (A) e [a, I] 
Pl(A) = (1-a�)/(1-a�) = a 
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Bel(A) = a�/1-a� = b 
thus 
Prob(A) e [b,a] 
However since 
b = ai311-a� = a(l-�)/1-a� <a 
then 
Bel(A) <a 
thus 
[Bel(A), Pl(A)] (L [Bel l  (A), Pl1 (A)] 
The process exhibits a nonmonotonicity. Thus it appears the introduction of conflict and the 
requirement for normalization introduces a nonmonotonicity into the process. 
As a first step in reducing this non-monotonicity we may try to use a different process for 
normalization then that used in Dempster's rule. We note that Dempster's rule essentially allocates 
the weights in the conflict set proportionately amongst the non conflicting focal elements. 
Dubois and Prade(1988) provide a comprehensive discussion of the issue of normalization 
in the aggregation of belief structures. In that paper they discuss a number of alternative procedures 
for aggregation. We shall look at a number of these and see their effect on the monotonicity issue. 
One alternative approach to normalization was suggested by Yager(l987). In this approach 
instead of proportionately distributing the conflict amongst all the focal elements we give it all to the 
base set X. Thus using this approach we get when A n B = cl> 
where in this case 
Hence in this case 
Again we note that 
and hence 
m1 nm2 =m 
m*(A) = aj3 
* -m (B) =a� 
* 
* -m (X) = uP + a� 
* - - - * PI (A) = ap + ap + ap = 1 - ap = a 
* - * Bel (A) = ap = b 
* * [Bel (A), Pl (A)] a:. [Bel1(A), PI1(B)] 
Thus the nonmonotonicity has not been eliminated. A second approach, one suggested by 
Dubois and Prade, is to replace conflict sets with the union of the two sets. Thus if A n B = cl> then 
use A U B. In this case we get 
where 
In this case we see that 
m+(AUB)=aP 
m+(A) = aj3 
m+(B) =a� 
m+(X) =a� 
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Pl+(A) = 1 - a�= a+ 
Bel+(A) =a�= b+ 
Since b+ = b * and a+= a* the situation is the same as in the previous method and the 
nonmonotonicity still exists. 
A third approach consists of applying a type of weighted averaging which essentially 
corresponds to a discounting. In this approach we calculate 
mo = cml + (1 - c)m2 
It can be shown that this approach still doesn't reduce the nonmonotonicity. 
Is there any procedure we can use that will reduce the nonmonotonicity? Essentially we see 
that the issue is that we must assign the conflict weight a� in a manner which brings up the Bel(A) 
to a. Thus we must assign a� to some set D such that D c A, because in that case 
Bel( A) = ai3 + al3 = a 
But must also do it in a way that D c B so that we keep the monotonicity with respect to m2, this 
requires that D c B. Since B (l A = <D the only possible value for D is the null set. Thus one 
possibility is to forgo the process of normalization. In this case we get 
where 
In this case we get that 
mV =ml nm2 
mV(<t>) =a� 
mV(A) = a13 
mV(B) =a� 
mV(X) a.� 
mVcml 
and thus the situation is monotonic. However the price we pay for this is that 
Pl(X)-:�: 1. 
We can consider a more general rule for the intersection offocal elements in the Dempster's 
rule. Assume A and B are two focal elemen ts from m1 and m2 then we define their conjunction as 
D =(An B) U (1- Poss(B/A)) * F(A,B)) In the above the function F(A,B) results in some subset of X. In all case when Poss(B/ A) == 1 we 
get An B. When Poss(B/A) = 0 the value depends upon the choice of F. 
In particular if we set 
F(A,B)=A U B  
then when Poss(B/ A) = 0 we get that 
D=AUB 
which is the suggestion of Dubois & Prade (1988). 
If we let 
F(A,B)=AUB 
then when A (I B = <D we get 
F(A,B) =X 
which is the suggestion of Yager (1987). 
If we let 
F(A,B) =A 
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then when A n B == <b we get 
D=A. 
The use of this last rule guarantees, even if conflicts arise, that 
m1 n m2cm1 
but not 
m1 n m2 cm2. 
This last approach introduces an idea of priority. It can be seen as a form of discounting, where m2 
is discounted if it conflicts with m 1 otherwise we don't discount it. 
4. Default Knowledge in Belief Structures 
In this section we show that the appearance of the nonmonotonicity rather than being a 
problem provides a natural facility for introducing default knowledge in the framework of belief 
structures. 
Assume V is a variable that takes its value in the set X. Assume we have two pieces of 
knowledge with respect to V. The first an absolute and the second a typical piece of knowledge: 
P1: Vis A 
P2: typically V is B. 
As discussed by Yager(1987b), essentially what we desire to happen in this case is that, if A 
n B :t:. <b we obtain A n B as our inference. If they don't intersect we discount the default 
knowledge and are left with A. We shall see that the reasoning mechanism in the theory of evidence 
essentially provides this capability. 
Yager(fo Appear) has suggested that one can represent a statement like 
typically V is B 
by a belief structure 
where 
m2(B)=a 
m2(X) = 1- a 
where a is close to one. The idea being that by typical knowledge we are saying that there is a high 
probability that V lies in the set B but some small chance it can be anywhere. 
Thus the above knowledge base can be represented in the Dempster-Shafer framework as 
two belief structures m 1 and m2. Where 
m1 (A)== 1 
m2(X) = 1- a 
Taking the conjunction of these two pieces of information we get 
m=m1 nm2. 
If A n B '# <b then we get 
In this case 
m(AnB)=a 
m(A) = 1- a 
Pl(A) = Bel(A) = Prob(A) = 1 
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thus we are certain that V lies in A. In addition 
thus 
Pl(A rtB) = 1 
Bel(A n B)= a 
a�Prob(A n B)� 1 
So that we get, as desired, that there is a high probability that V lies in An B. 
On the other hand if A n B = <1> and we use Dempster's normalization process we get 
m(A) = 1. 
Thus we see that we get the desired result that the typical knowledge is completely discounted when 
a conflict with absolute knowledge arises. 
5. Priorities and Strengths of Defaults 
We next consider the case in which we have two pieces of default knowledge: 
P1: typically Vis A 
P2: typically V is B 
In addressing this problem by one of the logical extension type methods we are faced with 
the issue of priority amongst the default rules. In particular if one of the default rules has a higher 
priority it is introduced first in the deduction process. If A n B -J:. <1> no problems arise and we infer 
A n B. If A n B = <1> and if P1 is considered to have a higher priority then we should infer A. 
While if P2 is considered to have a higher priority we should infer B. If P1 and P2 are considered 
to have some priority we should get a different result which is essentially the union of the two. 
Subsequently we shall see that the role of priority in the D-S framework is played by the probability 
assigned to the default set in each case. 
We can represent the above knowledge base by two belief structures m1 and m2 where 
m1(A) =a m2(B) = � 
m1 (X) = 1 - a m2(X) = 1 - f3 
In this representation we can see that a essentially describes the strength of the first default 
rule since Bel(A) ::::: a. That is a measures how cenain we are that A holds. 
In the above example our inferred belief structure is 
If A n B -J:. <Il then we get 
In this case 
thus 
m:::m1 nm2 
m(A n B) = al3 
m(A) = a[j 
m(B) =al3 
m(X) == aj3 
Pl(A n B) = 1 
Bel(A n B)::::: aj3 
Prob(A n B) � aj3 
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Since both a and J3 are very close to one this result essentially says that the inferred value 
for V is A n B. Since both A and B have small probabilities we can use the entailment principle to 
replace the above by 
m(A n B)= af3 
m(X) = 1 - af3 
This essentially says that we get typically A n B with a little less strength. 
If A n B = q, then we get 
m(A) = aj3/(l - af3) 
m(B) = aj3/(l - af3) 
m(X) = uf3/(1 - aJ3) 
Let us consider the case in which P1 is a stronger default rule then P2, a> (3. This 
essentially corresponds to P1 having a priority over P2. In the above since 
Bel(A) = aj3/(1 - af3) 
Bel(B) = 0:13/(1 - aj3) 
and with a> 13 it follows that aj3 > 0:13 we see that Bel(A) > Bel(B). The actual distinction depends 
upon the values for a and 13, the strengths of the defaults. 
Example: If a = .99 and 13 = .9 then 
In this case 
and 
m(A) = .9 
m(B) = .08 
m(X) = .02 
.9 S: Prob(A) s; .92 
.08 S: Prob(B) S: .1 
Thus there is a high probability that V lies in A and a small chance that V lies in B. In 
addition 
Prob(A U B) � .98 
In the case when P1 and P2 have the same strength (priority) then a= J3. In this case 
m(A) = aUJ(1 - a2) 
m(B) = a(i/(1 - a2) 
m(X) = aUJ(l - a2) 
In this case the belief and plausibility of A and B are equal. 
Example: If a= .95 then 
m(A) = .49 
m(B) = .49 
m(X) = .02 
In this case Prob(A) and Prob(B) are contained in (49,51). Which essentially says that we are about 
50 percent certain of each. From a pragmatic point of view if two rules are conflicting and are equal 
priority it would appear that we should not assign to high a strength to each. Thus if we let a= .5 
we get 
m(A) = 1/3 
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In this case 
m(B) = 1 /3 
m(X) = 1 /3 
1 /3 � Prob(A) � 2/3 
and 
2/3 � Prob(A U B)� 1 .  
Assume we have a proposition 
typically V is A 
to which we assign a strength a. Therefore 
From the entailment principle we can infer 
where 
m(A)=a 
m(X) = 1 - a 
* m (A) =a1 
m*(X) = 1 - a1 
a1 <a. 
Essentially what this implies is that we can always hedge, make less the degree of typicality, 
and still be correct. 
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